Bad apples: political paralysis and the quality of politicians by Leon, Gabriel
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bad Apples: 
Political Paralysis and the Quality of 
Politicians 
 
Gabriel J. Leon∗ 
London School of Economics 
August 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Suntory Centre 
Suntory and Toyota International Centres for  
Economics and Related Disciplines 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
 
EOPP 13     Tel:  (020) 7955 6674 
 
                                                 
∗ Address: STICERD, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United 
Kingdom. Email: g.j.leon@lse.ac.uk. Website: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/leongj. Tel: +44 7952 523 004.   
I wish to thank Tim Besley, Christopher Bliss, Paul Klemperer, Clare Leaver, Gilat Levy, Sebastian 
Linnemayr and Meg Meyer for their help and comments. I kindly acknowledge the financial support 
of the ESRC. 
Abstract 
 
 
Why do elected officials often suffer from political paralysis and fail to implement the 
best policies available? This paper considers a new yet intuitive explanation that 
focuses on the quality of the politicians competing to replace the incumbent.  The 
key insight is that a ‘good’ incumbent with preferences identical to those of  a 
representative voter will want to keep corrupt politicians out of office; she may do so 
by distorting her policy choices to signal her type and win re-election. The value of 
signalling and staying in office increases with the fraction of corrupt types in the 
population of politicians. Electing good types may therefore not be enough to ensure 
that the best policies are implemented, especially when corrupt politicians are 
common. This provides a new explanation for why political failure is particularly 
severe in corrupt democracies. 
 
JEL Codes:   H1, H54, D7, O10. 
Keywords: political agency, corruption, elections, term limits, economic reform, 
politician quality. 
  
 
This series is published by the Economic Organisation and Public Policy Programme 
(EOPP) located within the Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics 
and Related Disciplines (STICERD) at the London School of Economics and Political 
Science.  This new series is an amalgamation of the Development Economics 
Discussion Papers and the Political Economy and Public Policy Discussion Papers.  
The programme was established in October 1998 as a successor to the Development 
Economics Research Programme. The work of the programme is mainly in the fields 
of development economics, public economics and political economy. It is directed by 
Maitreesh Ghatak. Oriana Bandiera, Robin Burgess, and Andrea Prat serve as co-
directors, and associated faculty consist of Timothy Besley, Jean-Paul Faguet, Henrik 
Kleven, Valentino Larcinese, Gerard Padro i Miquel, Torsten Persson, Nicholas 
Stern, and Daniel M. Sturm.  Further details about the programme and its work can 
be viewed on our web site at http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/research/eopp. 
 
Our Discussion Paper series is available to download at: 
http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/series.asp?prog=EOPP 
 
For any other information relating to this series please contact Leila Alberici on: 
 
Telephone:  UK+20 7955 6674 
Fax:  UK+20 7955 6951 
Email:  l.alberici @lse.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© The author. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two 
paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, 
including © notice, is given to the source. 
1 Introduction
An important question in public economics is why goodpoliticians often fail to imple-
ment the best policies available. For example, elected o¢ cials in many countries often
avoid the economic reforms and public investment projects that would lead to greater
economic growth. For instance, the World Bank reports that Latin American coun-
tries are spending less than 2% of their GDP on infrastructure, and that this low level
of investment is hindering economic growth and poverty reduction (Fay and Morrison,
2005). The literature on political agency has shown that this failure can arise when the
incumbent has a legacy motive and receives ego-rents from being in o¢ ce, or when she
receives utility only while in o¢ ce (e.g. Maskin and Tirole, 2004). These explanations,
however, rely on specic assumptions about the preferences of politicians; in particular,
they assume politicians are never truly good.
In this paper we show that the best policies may be avoided even by politicians
who are truly good, in the sense that their preferences are identical to those of voters.
The mechanism behind this political failure is new to the literature, although it is very
intuitive. A good politician derives utility even when she is out of o¢ ce, and values
a good policy regardless of whether it was implemented by her or by somebody else.1
When some of the other politicians are corrupt, she will want to keep them out of o¢ ce
and avoid the policies they would implement. One way of doing this is by staying in o¢ ce
herself. This is our key insight: part of the value of being in o¢ ce lies in keeping corrupt
politicians out of power, and this value increases with the fraction of corrupt types in
the population of politicians. The composition of the political class therefore matters,
and in countries where most politicians are corrupt we would expect this political failure
to be particularly severe.
We work with a political agency model with two types of politicians: bad politicians
who are corrupt, and good politicians who have preferences identical to those of voters.
In each period an incumbent, who is good or bad, must choose whether to implement
a policy or not (i.e. become paralyzed). If she chooses to implement a policy, it can
be of two types: a long-term or a rent-extraction policy. Long-term policies require an
investment today and provide a return after the next election. Rent-extraction policies
allow the incumbent to appropriate funds, but produce no return.2 Both policies look
identical in the period they are implemented; their type becomes obvious once their re-
1That is, she solves an innite horizon problem that takes into account the policies implemented in
all future periods.
2Our results will hold even when rent-extraction provides some public return, as long as it is lower
than that of long-term policies.
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turn materializes (or not). This is an accurate description of many policies; for example,
public investment projects. Public projects can be used by corrupt politicians to extract
rents, and whether this is the case is not immediately clear because the returns do not
materialize for years. For example, it might take years before a dam is nished and it
is announced that it will operate at a fraction of its capacity. Even when there is no
substantial delay in the realization of the returns, a corrupt incumbent might succeed
in hiding the true outcome of his policies by, for example, manipulating government
statistics or limiting the amount of information the press can report.3
Naturally, corrupt politicians will want to implement the rent-extraction policies. In
order to di¤erentiate herself from them, a good incumbent may choose to signal her type
by becoming paralyzed, doing nothing instead of implementing a long-term policy. Since
this is costly, she will do so only when the value of ensuring that future politicians are
good is high; in other words, when a large fraction of politicians is corrupt. As a result,
choosing a good politician does not ensure that the best policies will be implemented,
as the quality of her challengers matters too.
The model yields three main insights. First, paralysis may arise in equilibrium when
the proportion of corrupt politicians is high; this provides a new explanation for why po-
litical failure is particularly severe in corrupt democracies. In this equilibrium paralysis
in the rst period allows the good incumbents to signal their type and win re-election.
Although costly because it involves not implementing a long-term policy in the rst
period, paralysis allows the good politician to delay the election of a future incumbent
who might be corrupt. Therefore, paralysis is only valuable when it is likely that the
successors will be corrupt, which is the case when the proportion of bad politicians is
high. This suggests that we need to look beyond elections at how citizens decide to enter
politics. Along these lines, we show that allowing for endogenous entry into politics has
no clear e¤ect on paralysis: paralysis may keep corrupt citizens from entering politics
and this makes it more attractive; but this lack of entry improves the average quality
of politicians, decreases the value of re-election, and makes signalling through paralysis
less attractive.
Second, longer term limits decrease the proportion of bad politicians for which the
good types become paralyzed, and thus makes it more likely. This is because in equilib-
rium paralysis in the rst term reveals the good politicians type, independently of the
term limit. The benet of retaining the good incumbent, however, increases with the
3This was the strategy followed by Alberto Fujimori in Peru; McMillan and Zoido (2004) provide a
fascinating analysis of this case. For the role of the media in constraining the behavior of politicians, see
Besley and Prat (2006).
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number of terms that she is allowed to remain in o¢ ce. The fact that the election of
a possibly corrupt successor is delayed further into the future translates into paralysis
being optimal even when the fraction of bad politicians is small.
Third, although paralysis may be eliminated by reducing term limits, this is not
optimal when the proportion of bad politicians is high. This is because paralysis allows
for what the political agency literature calls selection: voters identify bad incumbents
and vote them out of o¢ ce.4 Paralysis can be optimal precisely because it allows voters
to distinguish between the good and bad types, so that they can re-elect the good and
remove the bad. Selection is particularly valuable when most politicians are bad, so that
you wish to identify those rare good types and keep them in o¢ ce, and remove the bad
straight away. When most politicians are good, on the other hand, selection is not very
useful and it is optimal to avoid paralysis. This causes the bad types to be re-elected
too often, but this is not a major concern since bad politicians are rare. It also causes
good types to be voted out too often, but since the successor is likely to be good, this is
not very costly.
Paralysis is similar to pandering, a term used by Maskin and Tirole (2004) to
describe instances in which re-election concerns lead a politician to choose an inferior
but popular action. Pandering arises because politicians are motivated by the benets
they can enjoy only when in o¢ ce: being the one who implements the good policies (the
legacy motive) and the enjoyment of power for its sake alone (ego-rents). Smart and
Sturm (2006) refer to pandering as a reason for having two term limits. In their model,
politicians value being in o¢ ce and may implement suboptimal policies in order to win
re-election. Term limits shorten their horizon and hence lower the value of re-election,
leading to "truthful behavior" as each incumbent type implements her preferred policy.
Our paper di¤ers in two main respects. First, we consider politicians who receive
utility even when out of o¢ ce, and show that a distortion can arise for a di¤erent reason:
good politicians wish to keep potentially corrupt future incumbents out of o¢ ce for as
long as possible. Second, we emphasize the negative impact the presence of corrupt
politicians has on the behavior of good incumbents. We show that paralysis and long
term limits may be optimal when the proportion of bad politicians is high. Our results
suggest that countries with high levels of corruption, like many in the developing world,
are more likely to su¤er from paralysis. This provides one explanation for why these
countries often fail to implement economic reform programs and development policies
that would clearly have a positive impact on their economies.5
4See Besley (2005), Besley (2006) and Besley and Smart (2007).
5There is also an important modelling di¤erence in that our good politicians solve an innite period
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Our concern with the identity of future policymakers is also a key feature in Tabellini
and Alesina (1990), where budget decits may arise because a current majority wishes
to tie the hands of a future majority with potentially di¤erent policy preferences. As
in our paper, policies are chosen primarily because they reduce the future governments
ability to implement policy; in Tabellini and Alesina (1990) it is by tying up resources,
while here it is by keeping other politician types out of o¢ ce. The equilibria in this paper
are similar to those in Rogo¤ (1990), who focuses on competency as an explanation for
the political budget cycle. In his model, politicians distort their policy choices in order
to signal their innate abilities to voters. The failure of good politicians to implement
long-term policies is also related to the concept of policy myopia studied by Aidt and
Dutta (2007). Finally, our analysis has placed particular emphasis on the impact corrupt
politicians have on the actions of the good types. Understanding how citizens decide
to enter politics, and whether they will be good or bad politicians, is a very important
question that has been partly addressed by Besley (2005) and Caselli and Morelli (2002).
This paper is also closely related to the literature on the implementation of economic
reform. A well-known paper by Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) focuses on how ex-ante
uncertainty about the distribution of the gains from reform can cause a majority to
oppose a policy, even though ex-post a (potentially di¤erent) majority would support
it. Alesina and Drazen (1991) look at why macroeconomic stabilization is often delayed.
They argue that stabilizations involve a cost, and that conict about how this cost is
distributed between di¤erent groups in society leads to a war of attrition that delays
the stabilization. Our paper addresses a similar question, but focuses on a di¤erent
explanation that is based on political agency.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 derives the main result of the model and considers some generalizations and exten-
sions. Section 4 provides some concluding remarks and suggests some avenues for future
research.
2 A Model of Policy Implementation
In this section we develop a political agency model that follows the pioneering work of
Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986),6 where an incumbent politician must choose a single
policy in every period that she is in o¢ ce. She can run for re-election but can only be in
problem. In Maskin and Tirole (2004) and Smart and Sturm (2006) politicians do not value the future
after they leave o¢ ce.
6There is also a parallel empirical literature that nds evidence in support of the predictions of these
models; for example, Besley and Case (1995a,b, 2003) and List and Sturm (2006).
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o¢ ce for at most T periods, after which a new politician must be elected, i.e. she faces
a T term limit. Voters are innitely lived and at the end of each period must choose
whether to re-elect the incumbent or vote for a challenger who is randomly drawn from
the pool of politicians.
Politicians can be of two types: good or bad. Good politicians have preferences
identical to those of voters; they value all payo¤s to the voters and nothing else. In
particular, they value these payo¤s regardless of whether they themselves are in o¢ ce,
which implies that their preferences are over an innite horizon. Their utility is given
by
V Gt =
1X
j=t
vGj
where vGj is the per period payo¤. Bad politicians, on the other hand, only value any
rents they may extract while in o¢ ce. Their utility is given by
V Bt =
1X
j=t
vBj  Ij
where Ij = 1 if the bad politician is the incumbent in period j, and Ij = 0 otherwise. A
proportion  of politicians is good.
Votersutility is also given by V Gt . They receive a xed income y each period and
cannot directly observe whether a politician is good or bad, although they know that
a proportion  is good. They will re-elect the incumbent, provided she has been in
o¢ ce for less than T periods, with a probability  that maximizes the expected present
discounted value of their stream of future payo¤s. All players share a discount factor of
.
The politicians must choose whether to implement a policy (P) or do nothing (N).
The cost of implementing a policy is y, and the policy can be of two types: a long-
term policy (L) or a rent-extraction policy (X). Long-term policies generate y(1 + r)
at the beginning of the following period. For simplicity, we assume that this cannot be
expropriated or re-invested, and it all accrues to the voters. Rent extraction policies allow
politicians to expropriate the amount y in the current period and generate no return
in the next. One can think of this in terms of one policy (P) that can be implemented
in one of two possible ways, (L) or (X): for example, an infrastructure project may be
built properly or the money may be stolen and the project left unnished.7 At the time
7Our di¤erentiation between the two types of policies aims for simplicity and is admittedly stark,
as in practice one would expect most policies that allow for rent extraction to also generate some social
benet.
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of implementation, voters can only see that something is being done (P), but cannot
distinguish between (L) and (X). Only at the beginning of the next period when the
return materializes (or not) do voters discover the type of policy that was adopted.
Except for the politicians type and whether the policy implemented was a long-term
or a rent-extraction policy, everything is public information. The total payo¤s received
by a good politician and the voters in period t depend on the policy implemented:
vGt =
8><>:
y if policy = N
(1  ) y + y(1 + r) if policy = L
(1  ) y if policy = X
9>=>; ;
where we assume that long-term policies (L) have a positive net present discounted
value, i.e.  (1 + r) > 1. We will say that a good incumbent su¤ers from political
paralysis when he fails to implement a long-term policy (L). Similarly, the total payo¤s
for a bad politician from period t policies are
vBt =
8><>:
0 if policy = N
0 if policy = L
y if policy = X
9>=>; :
This setup incorporates a number of important assumptions. First, good types value
policy outcomes that occur even after they have left o¢ ce, while bad incumbents do
not. We feel this is realistic since one would expect good politicians to consider the
future consequences of their decisions in a way that bad politicians would not. Second,
we assume that a policys outcome is not observable until the next period. This is true
of numerous policies, e.g. those associated with growth and development, education,
a scal stimulus, etc.8 Finally, we have assumed that rent-extraction must take place
through rent-extraction policies and that direct looting is not possible.9
Let 1  t  T refer to the current incumbents tth term in o¢ ce. The voters
beliefs about the incumbents type depend on the policies she implements and whether
there has been a change in the incumbents identity. Their ex-ante belief, formed after
the returns from the previous periods policy have been realized but before the current
periods policy has been chosen, is denoted by at where
at = Pr(incumbent is good j information at beginning of period t)
8We are also assuming that citizens cannot directly observe a politicians type. This assumption is
common in the literature; see, for example, Coate and Morris (1995) and Besley (2006).
9Coate and Morris (1995) show why incumbents may choose indirect rent-extraction methods.
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where at =  if a new incumbent has been voted into o¢ ce; otherwise it is given by
at
 
t 1; 
p
t 1

, where t 1 is the policy implemented in period t   1, where t 1 2
fN;L;Xg. Any new information is incorporated using Bayesrule.
This is updated into the ex-post belief pt after the period t policy is implemented:
pt = Pr(incumbent is good j 0t; at ):
where 0t 2 fN;Pg is the policy type implemented in period t and Bayesrule is used
to incorporate any new information. The voters re-elect the incumbent with probability
t (
p
t ), where t : 
p
t ! [0; 1] and is chosen to maximize their expected payo¤.
We can now describe the timeline of the game in each period t:
(1) i) If t = 1, nature chooses an incumbent who is good with probability  and at = .
ii) If t > 1 and a policy (P ) was implemented in the previous period, it is revealed
to have been (L) or (X), and the voters form at using Bayesrule. iii) Otherwise
at = 
p
t 1.
(2) The incumbent decides whether to implement a policy (P ) or not (N). If she
implements a policy, then she must decide whether it is a long-term (L) or a
rent-extraction (X) policy.
(3) The voters observe whether a policy was implemented or not fN;Pg, and form
their ex-post belief pt using Bayesrule.
(4) i) If t < T , the voters re-elect with probability t (
p
t ). If re-election occurs, t
increases by 1. ii) If not, or if t = T , then set t = 1.
The payo¤s in this game depend entirely on the incumbents type and the voters
beliefs about the incumbents type, as given by at and 
p
t .
10 It then seems natural
to focus on the Markov Perfect equilibria of the game, so that strategies can only be
contingent on payo¤ relevant state variables and the history of the actions taken in
period t. This rules out any e¤ects due to the past interaction between voters and
previous governments, not an unreasonable restriction considering that the identity of
the incumbent has changed.
Dene the mappings gt : 
a
t ! fN;L;Xg, bt : at ! fN;L;Xg and t : pt ! [0; 1].
Here gt (
a
t ) is the policy implemented by a good incumbent in period t if the voters
10Whether a long-term policy was implemented in the last period of the previous government will
also a¤ect payo¤s, but since we have assumed these payo¤s cannot be expropriated or reinvested and
utility is linear, they have no inuence on the strategies chosen.
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ex-ante belief is at , and similarly with 
b
t for the bad type. For the voters, t (
p
t ) is
the probability that they re-elect an incumbent they believe to be good with probability
pt . A strategy for a good incumbent is S
G =

g1; :::; 
g
T
	
, for a bad incumbent is SB =
b1; :::; 
b
T
	
and for the voters SV = f1; :::; T 1g : A strategy prole
 
SG; SB; SV

and
the set of beliefs (a1; 
p
1)  :::
 
aT ; 
p
T

are a MPE if after any within period history,
each players strategy is optimal given every other players strategy and beliefs, where
beliefs are computed from the equilibrium strategies using Bayesrule.
3 Political Paralysis
We rst focus on the case where incumbents face a two term limit; it provides most of
the insight without the di¢ culties that higher term limits introduce (which we consider
in Section 3.3).
3.1 Two Term Limit
We restrict our attention to instances where paralysis arises as part of an equilibrium
in which politicians have pure strategies. Solving backwards, in period 2 the good types
always implement a long-term policy (L) and the bad types always extract rents (X). We
should note that this is also the solution to the one term limit case, where incumbents
are not allowed to be re-elected.
In the rst period the bad types also always extract rents, since doing so ensures them
a payo¤ of at least y, while implementing (L) or (N) provides a payo¤ of at most y,
and only if they win re-election after the rst period. In short, rent extraction strictly
dominates the other policy choices for the bad types. The good types will then optimally
choose between (N) and (L). There is only one (pure strategy) equilibrium with paralysis
and it involves strategies SG = (N;L) and SB = (X;X) for the politicians. We will
refer to this as the paralysis equilibrium.
We assume that this prole represents part of an equilibrium and derive the con-
ditions that must hold for this to be the case. The choice of policy in period 1 will
completely reveal the incumbents type,11 and the optimal voting rule calls for 1 (1) = 1
and 1 (0) = 0, since the incumbent can do no better than re-elect a good type (since
he chooses policy (L)) and no worse than re-elect a bad type (since he always extracts
rents). This equilibrium calls for a good incumbent to be paralyzed in the rst period,
be re-elected with probability 1, and then implement a long-term policy in the second
11Formally, p1 (N;) = 1 and 
p
1 (P; ) = 0:
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period. The bad types always extract rents in the rst period and are voted out of o¢ ce.
If the good incumbent deviates and implements (L), he is voted out of o¢ ce.
Given this voting rule, we need to derive the condition for the good types not to
deviate. We do so by nding when V G(N) > V G(L), where these are the payo¤s to
the good incumbent from implementing no policy and from implementing a long-term
policy in the rst period, respectively. We can write
V G(N) = [y +  [(1  ) y + y (1 + r)]] + 2K (1)
where the term in brackets is the payo¤ from no policy in period 1, which leads to certain
re-election and a long-term policy in period 2. After this, the term limit binds and a
new incumbent must be elected, with the continuation payo¤ given by K. Similarly, we
can write
V G(L) = [(1  ) y + y (1 + r)] + K (2)
where now the rst term in brackets reects the payo¤ from a period 1 deviation to policy
(L), which causes a certain loss of the election and an earlier arrival of the continuation
payo¤K.
In order to establish the value of K; we observe that the Markov restriction implies
that if the paralysis equilibrium strategies are followed by the current incumbent, they
will be followed by all future incumbents. This implies the recursive relation K =


y +  [(1  ) y + y (1 + r)] + 2K+(1  ) [(1  ) y + K], where we have taken
into account the fact that the new incumbent will be good with probability . We solve
for K to obtain
K =
[y   (1  )y] +  [(1  ) y + y (1 + r)]
1  (2 + (1  ) ) (3)
This is the formula for an innite geometric series, where the numerator is the ex-
pected payo¤ to voters from period t policies under the paralysis equilibrium, and
the denominator is 1 minus the weighted discount factor. The rst term in the nu-
merator, y   (1  )y, is the expected period 1 payo¤, given that in equilibrium
a good incumbent implements (N) and a bad type chooses (X). The second term,
 [(1  ) y + y (1 + r)], is  times the discounted payo¤from having a good politician
in o¢ ce in period 2. There is no period two counterpart for the bad types because they
are voted out of o¢ ce at the end of period 1. The weighted discount factor 2+(1  ) 
reects that the good types stay in o¢ ce for two periods, so that " of the time" we
must discount by 2, while the bad types stay only for one period, so that "1   of the
10
time" we must only discount by .
Comparing (1) and (2) and using (3) we nd that V G(N) > V G(L) when
 < 1   (1 + r)  1
2 (1 + r)
 b2 (4)
This establishes the following result:
Proposition 1 With a two term limit, political paralysis is an equilibrium when the
proportion of good types in the pool of politicians is su¢ ciently low, as dened by  < b2.
In this two period case the good incumbent faces a decision between implementing
the policy today and being voted out of o¢ ce, and waiting one period doing nothing
and implementing the policy in the next. The net cost of delaying the implementation
of (L) is given by
V G(N)  V G(L) = y   (1  ) [(1  ) y + y (1 + r) + K] (5)
Delay is optimal when this cost is small, which is the case only if the value of K is small
enough. This, in turn, requires that K be composed of many instances where (X) is
implemented, which will be the case if a large proportion of politicians is bad. In this
case a good incumbent will try to delay the potential election of a bad politician, even if
that requires that he alter his own policy choices. When there are few bad politicians,
however, this strategy is too costly: the incumbent might as well implement a long-
term policy, since after losing the election he is bound to be followed by another good
politician.
It is straightforward to verify that the value b2 is decreasing in r. This is because a
higher return makes long-term policies more productive, and thus increases the net cost
of delay. In particular, this causes K to increase, and so the proportion of bad politicians
1   necessary to make paralysis optimal will increase.
Alternatively, we can solve for r in (4):
r <
1
 [1   (1  )]   1  br2
where now br2 gives us the maximum rate of return for which paralysis will be optimal.
When the returns are above this level, delay is too costly and the good incumbent will
implement the long-term policy. An increase in  decreases br2: when the proportion
of good politicians is high, the return from policies needs to be low for paralysis to be
11
optimal. This has the implication that when most politicians are bad (i.e.  is low),
only policies with very high rates of return will be implemented.
We should note that there is also a family of equilibria in which the good types
implement (L). We will denote its representative member the no paralysis equilibrium,
since it involves the good types playing (L) and the bad types playing (X) in both periods,
and both getting re-elected with at least some minimum probability    (; ; r). To
compute the value of , note that in this equilibrium the good incumbent receives
V G(L) = (1  )y + y(1 + r) +  [(1  )y + y(1 + r) + K] + (1  )K
because she implements a long-term policy in the current period; if re-elected, she imple-
ments another long-term policy and must leave o¢ ce, if not re-elected, she leaves o¢ ce
and a new incumbent takes over. If she deviates, her payo¤ is given by
V G(N) = y +  [(1  )y + y(1 + r) + K]
because she is found to be good after doing nothing in the rst period, and so is re-elected
and implements a long-term policy in the next period. In equilibrium, the continuation
value is one where the good always implement long-term policies and the bad always
extract rents, and so is given by
K =  [(1  )y + y(1 + r) +  [(1  )y + y(1 + r) + K] + (1  )K]
+ (1  ) [(1  )y +  [(1  )y + K] + (1  )K]
which gives the value of K:
K =
(1  )y + y(1 + r) + (1  )y + 2y(1 + r)
1  2    (1  )
The no deviation condition is given by V G(L) > V G(N), and solving using the above
expressions gives the condition:
 >   max

0;
1  (1 + r) [1  (1  )]
2 (1 + r) (1  )

;
where  is decreasing in . The voters are indi¤erent between the values of , because
in equilibrium the ex-post probability of a good type in period 1 is still  (because of
the pooling). Re-electing the incumbent or choosing a new randomly drawn politician
results in the same continuation value.
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3.2 Endogenous Politician Quality
In this section we allow citizens to determine whether to participate in politics, so that
the quality of the pool of politicians becomes endogenous. A valid question to ask in
this context is whether it becomes easier to support a paralysis equilibrium. We show
that endogenizing politician quality can have an ambiguous e¤ect.
Suppose that there are N citizens, and a proportion  of them is good. Denote by
e the proportion of politicians who are good. Furthermore, let us suppose that entry is
costless for the good types, since they are public-spirited, but the bad types face a cost
 > 0 per election. Let e be the fraction of bad citizens who enter politics.
It follows that all good citizens become politicians, and that bad types will enter as
long as
 <
1
N + e(1  )N y
where y are the per-period rents they extract, and 1N+e(1 )N is the probability that
they are elected. Solving for e we nd that12
e = d y
(1  )N  

1   e
where d:e denotes rounding down to the closest integer. Note that the condition e  1
implies that yN  1. We can then write
e = 
N
y
;
so that the proportion of good politicians is now higher because some bad citizens may
not enter politics.
Will paralysis be supported for a greater range of  values? The answer is unclear: on
the one hand, paralysis reduces entry of bad citizens, and so one would expect it to arise
for a greater range of  parameter values. On the other hand, this e¤ect reduces the cost
of being voted out of o¢ ce, since the incumbent is more likely to be followed by another
good politician. So it is unclear whether deviations from the paralysis equilibrium by
the good incumbent become optimal for a greater range of  values.
12We are assuming that the solution is positive.
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3.3 General Case: T>2 Term Limit
Allowing for longer term limits does not a¤ect the analysis in any fundamental way,
although it poses a number of additional technical di¢ culties. In particular, it is no
longer strictly dominant for the bad types to extract rents. This is easy to see in the
case of three terms: the bad types might nd it optimal to pool in the rst period if that
allows them to win re-election with positive probability and extract rents in the latter
two periods. This in turn implies that we can no longer limit the good typesdecision
to one between (N) and (L). It might be possible, for example, for both types to pool
on (X). This type of behavior on the part of the good types seems counter-intuitive, so
for simplicity we make the following assumption:
Assumption Good politicians never extract rents (X).
We leave the derivation of the equilibria to the Appendix, but as before, the only
equilibrium with paralysis involves the good type being paralyzed in the rst period,
being recognized as good and then re-elected until term limits bind, while implementing
(L) in every remaining period. Meanwhile, the bad types implement (X) in the rst
period and are voted out of o¢ ce. Bad types will not deviate if the gain from extracting
rents in period 1 and being voted out of o¢ ce, y, exceeds the equilibrium gain from
deviation,  [y + y]. This latter expression reects the fact that pooling in period 1
allows the bad type to win re-election, extract rents in period 2, be taken for a good
incumbent and win re-election for a third period; he then extracts rents in periods 2 and
3. Solving for the above conditions shows that the bad incumbent will not deviate if
2 +   1.13
As in the previous section, the good type will not deviate if
 < 1  (1  )
(1  T 1)
 (1 + r)  1
2 (1 + r)
 bT (6)
We can then state the following results:
Proposition 2 (i) With a term limit of T , political paralysis may arise in equilibrium
when the proportion of good types in the pool of politicians is su¢ ciently low, as dened
by  < bT , and politicians are su¢ ciently impatient, as given by 2+   1. (ii) Longer
term limits lead to the possibility of paralysis at increasingly higher value of , sincebT 1 < bT for all T .
13We can write this as   0:62, which is the solution for 2 +   1 that falls in [0; 1].
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When politicians are impatient, the bad types will always extract rents in the rst
period (X) and be voted out of o¢ ce. On the other hand, good types will be paralyzed
in the rst period, convey their type to voters, and win re-election until term limits bind.
They implement long-term policies in every period except the rst.
As term limits increase, political paralysis can arise for a smaller proportion of bad
politicians. This is because the longer the term limit, the more valuable it is to identify
good types, since you can keep them longer. The cost of identication, on the other
hand, is the same in all cases: paralysis in the rst period. Being able to keep the good
politicians longer allows them to implement long-term policies in all but the rst period,
and make paralysis more attractive.
As before, there is also a family of equilibria in which the good types implement (L)
and the bad types implement (X) in every period. In period 2 the voter sees whether
the period 1 policy was (L) or (X), and re-elects until the term limit binds if it was a
long-term policy, and votes the incumbent out of o¢ ce if it was a rent-extraction scheme.
Finally, note that there is no paralysis when no re-election is allowed. We have
argued that paralysis arises because it allows good types to convey their type before an
election. It is then natural that without re-election there should be no paralysis.
3.4 Optimal Term Limits
In the previous two sections we derived the conditions under which paralysis may arise
as a function of the term limit T .14 One could then think of eliminating paralysis by
simply reducing term limits; we have seen that there is no paralysis when term limits
are set equal to one. This may not be optimal, however: paralysis allows voters to
distinguish between the good and bad types, so that they can re-elect the good and vote
the bad out of o¢ ce. The fact that bad types can be identied and removed from o¢ ce
is referred to as selectionin the literature15.
In this section we show that paralysis may be optimal for voters. For simplicity, we
restrict our attention to cases where 2 +   1; when other equilibria are possible, we
assume paralysis is the one that arises. We can write the welfare for the one term limit
14There is a large literature that looks at the question of term limits. Aside from Smart and Sturm
(2006), other interesting papers include Adams and Kenny (1986), Dick and Lott Jr. (1993), Glaeser
(1997), and Lopez (2003).
15More generally, Besley (2005), Besley (2006) and Besley and Smart (2007) show that elections can
serve to discipline and select bad politicians. Discipline refers to cases where the bad types constrain their
behavior in order to remain in o¢ ce. In our model, the bad types are never disciplined in equilibrium,
because their type is revealed one period after they extract rents. Being disciplined then accomplishes
nothing for them: it just delays the rents they could have extracted earlier.
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case as
W1 =
(1  ) y + y (1 + r)
1   :
Here the good implement L and the bad choose X every period. Because a new incum-
bent is elected every period, the welfare is simply a discounted sum of expected payo¤s,
where the expectation is with respect to the proportion of good types in the population.
For T  2, the welfare generated by the paralysis equilibrium increases with T . The
reason is intuitive: longer term limits do not increase the cost of paralysis, since it is
always enough for the good incumbent to be paralyzed in the rst period. Its benets,
on the other hand, increase as the good incumbents are allowed to stay in o¢ ce longer,
while bad politicians are voted out of o¢ ce after period 1. For T ! 1, the welfare is
given by
W1 =


y +

1   [(1  ) y + y (1 + r)]

+ (1  ) (1  ) y
1  (1  )  :
Once a good incumbent is voted into o¢ ce, he is paralyzed in the rst period but is then
re-elected forever, implementing (L) in every period except the rst. This is captured by
the rst term in the numerator. Bad types stay in o¢ ce for only one period, and this is
captured by the second term in the numerator. The denominator shows that incumbent
changes are due only to the bad types being voted out of o¢ ce.
The analysis requires that we consider the trade-o¤ between changing incumbents
every period, with a cost of voting good types out of o¢ ce on occasion, and keeping
the good ones when found, with the cost of paralysis in the rst period. In general, one
would expect the paralysis equilibrium to be optimal when the bad types are numerous:
voters would want to identify the occasional good type and re-elect him, while voting
the bad types out of o¢ ce after one period. When most politicians are good, on the
other hand, paralysis is costly and achieves little. In this case it is better to sometimes
vote a good incumbent out of o¢ ce, since it is likely that his successor will be a good
politician too.
ComparingW1 andW1 gives us a sense for when paralysis may be optimal. Dening
bw  1   +  (1 + r) (2   1)
2 (1 + r)
we can state the following result:
Proposition 3 It can be optimal to induce political paralysis by not setting any term
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limits when the proportion of good politicians in the population is low, as given by  < bw,
and politicians are impatient, as given by 2 +   1.
In these cases it is valuable to identify those rare good politicians when they are in
o¢ ce, and then keep them in o¢ ce forever. On the other hand, if  is high, it is better
to have the good types implement long-term policies in the rst period. They get voted
out of o¢ ce, but since good politicians are abundant, it is likely that their successors
will be good as well. To induce this behavior, term limits must be short.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper has shown that the presence of corrupt politicians can induce public-spirited
incumbents to become paralyzed. Paralysis allows the good types to communicate their
type and win re-election, which is valuable because by staying in power they can delay the
election of potentially corrupt successors. Paralysis becomes more likely as the proportion
of bad types in the population increases.
Naturally, this explanation does not apply to every instance of political paralysis
seen in practice. Since our argument relies on future elections inducing good types to
become paralyzed, we cannot explain any instances where re-election is not allowed. In
our model this limitation is underscored by the fact that good politicians never su¤er
from paralysis in their last period in o¢ ce.
We have assumed throughout that the electoral system functions properly, in the
sense that elections are fair and the outcomes are respected by all parties involved. The
incumbents only advantage comes from his ability to potentially convey information
about his type through his choice of policy. In practice, in many regions of the world
incumbents have a substantial number of advantages when running for re-election. In
particular, we might expect the bad politicians to derive some (possibly illegal) incum-
bency advantages that increase their probability of winning re-election; for example, they
could use the rents extracted while in o¢ ce for campaigning. Our analysis relies on the
implicit assumption that even when many politicians are corrupt, the electoral system
will work properly. If this is not the case, then a one term limit might be optimal, as it
might serve as a constitutional constraint.16
16For a model along these lines, see Glaeser (1997). However, even constitutional term limits have
their limitations, as powerful leaders might pressure Congress into changing them. Latin America alone
provides numerous recent examples: Menem in Argentina, Alvaro Uribe in Colombia, Alberto Fujimori
in Peru, and Hugo Chavez in Venezuela.
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A number of avenues for future research should be mentioned. First, electoral systems
not only di¤er in the number of times an incumbent is allowed to run for re-election,
but also on how many years each period lasts. The length of each period would have
implications for whether the outcome of a long-term policy is realized before or after
the next election. A more exible framework that allows us to vary both term limits
and the length of each term would possibly provide additional insights. In addition, we
have largely assumed the proportion of bad politicians to be exogenous to the electoral
process. In reality, we would expect term limits, among other factors, to determine who
runs for o¢ ce. One could then hope to reduce the number of bad politicians by designing
the electoral process appropriately.
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5 Appendix
We derive the equilibria for the case with a term limit of T . We begin by considering
the pair of actions (gt ; 
b
t), where 
g
t refers to the action taken by the good incumbent
at time t and gt is dened analogously for the bad type. All of the following seven
conditions must be true in equilibrium:
i) In the last two periods the bad types extract rents. In the last period the bad
type implements (X). In the next to last period there is no reason to do anything but
implement (X), which gives a payo¤ of at least y, and is greater than the best he can
do by deviating to (N) or (L), since these provide at most y.
ii) If the bad incumbent implements (X) in period t, then he implements (X) in all
future periods he is in o¢ ce. Assume that (X) is implemented for the rst time in period
t0, so that the incumbents type becomes known at time t0 + 1 at the latest. If a known
bad type were to remain in o¢ ce until period T   2, he would then be voted out of
o¢ ce because in periods T   1 and T he extracts rents (this follows from i)). Then it is
optimal for the bad type to extract rents in period T   2. This being so, it is optimal
for the voter to remove him from o¢ ce at the end of period T   3. By induction, at the
end of t0 + 1 the incumbent will be voted out if he is bad, and hence he will choose to
extract rents in that period. This establishes that once the bad type implements (X),
he will continue to implement it until he is voted out of o¢ ce.
iii) A bad incumbent can only extract rents in at most two (consecutive) periods.
From ii) we know that once rent has been extracted in one period, the bad incumbent
will continue to extract rents until he is removed from o¢ ce. It is then optimal to vote
out a bad type as soon as he is recognized. Since (X) is revealed in the next period, then
the bad types can extract rents in at most two consecutive periods.
iv) If the bad incumbents strategy calls for (X) at time t, then the good incumbent
implements (L) in all future periods he is in o¢ ce. This is because at that point the
incumbents type, whether good or bad, would be known, and the good incumbent has
no reason to implement any policy other than (L).
v) No equilibrium can involve gt = N and 
b
t = L or 
g
t = L and 
b
t = N . These
reveal the bad incumbents type without providing any benets. In both cases he would
deviate to (X).
vi) No equilibrium can involve gt = 
b
t = L. This would imply that the bad type has
not extracted rents yet (otherwise ii) would be violated). By deviating and implementing
(X) the bad type receives an expected payo¤ of y + y, while the most that he can
obtain by not deviating is  (y + y), from iii). Since the former is always greater
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than the latter, the bad type would deviate.
vii) No equilibrium can involve gt = N and 
b
t = X at any time other than in period
1. Assume that these actions are played in some period t > 1. Then from iv) it must be
that this is the rst (X) that the bad type implements. It is also his last, since his type is
revealed, and because ii) implies that he will continue implementing (X) until voted out,
it is optimal for voters to choose a new incumbent. If this is the case, however, it would
have been optimal for him to implement (X) earlier on, contradicting the requirement
that this be the rst time that (X) is implemented.
From these 7 conditions it follows that any equilibria must have the politicians fol-
lowing one of the following strategies:
a) Paralysis Strategies: Good plays g1 = N and 
g
j = L for 2 < j  T . Bad plays
bt = X for 1  t  T:
We rst show that these strategies form part of an equilibrium. In this equilibrium
types are perfectly revealed in the rst period, and it is optimal for the voter to re-elect
the good types and vote the bad types out of o¢ ce. At t = 1 the bad types will not
deviate if they are su¢ ciently impatient, as given by 2 +  < 1. This follows from
comparing the payo¤ from deviation, y+ 2y; with the payo¤ from no deviation, y.
The good incumbent will not deviate at time t = 1 i¤
y + 

1  T 1
1  

[(1  ) y + y (1 + r)] + TK > [(1  ) y + y (1 + r)] + K (7)
where the left hand side is the value of not deviating when the incumbent can remain
at most T terms in o¢ ce, and the right hand side reects the fact that the incumbent is
voted out of o¢ ce if he deviates. The continuation value in this equilibrium is given by
K =

h
y + 
h
1 T 1
1 
i
[(1  ) y + y (1 + r)]
i
+ (1  ) (1  ) y
1  [T + (1  ) ] (8)
where the denominator reects the fact that di¤erent incumbent types remain in o¢ ce
for di¤erent lengths of time. Using (8) to solve (7) we obtain the following:
 < 1  (1  )
(1  T 1)
 (1 + r)  1
2 (1 + r)
which is the condition given in the text.
Given these period 1 actions, it is optimal for the bad types to implement (X) in every
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future period (follows from ii)), and so it is optimal for the good types to implement (L)
in every future period (follows from iv)).
b) No Paralysis Strategies: Good plays gt = L for 1  t  T . Bad plays bt = X for
1  t  T:
There is a no paralysis equilibrium where the optimal re-election rule in periods
t  2, when the incumbents type will be known, involves removing the bad types and
keeping the good types. In the rst period, however, the types remain unknown, and
any voting rule is optimal, since the expected payo¤ from re-electing the incumbent is
exactly equal to that of electing a new politician. Since a deviation to (N) could be
attributed to either type, it provides no new information. Consequently, the optimal
re-election rule following deviation must be the same as when there is no deviation, by
the Markov restriction.
The bad incumbent could deviate and play (L). In period 2 it would become clear that
no rents were extracted, and he would be re-elected. He will not deviate if y+ y >
 (y + y), where the left hand side is the expected payo¤from no deviation, while the
right hand side is the maximum possible income following deviation. Since this condition
always holds, the bad type never deviates in the rst period. (Similar reasoning rules out
deviations to (N)). Having implemented (X) in the rst period, condition ii) implies that
he will not deviate in the future. The good type clearly gains nothing from deviating,
since his re-election probability does not change.
c) Pooling Strategies: Let t0 2 f1; :::; T   2g. In a pooling equilibrium, the good
incumbent would play gt = N for 1  t  t0 and gt = L for t0 < t  T . The bad
incumbent would play bt = N for 1  t  t0 and gt = X for t0 < t  T:
However, there are no pooling equilibria consisting of these strategies. The reason
is that in the rst period both types have an incentive to deviate, and so deviations
are non-informative. This implies that the equilibrium voting rule must be the same
even after a deviation, by the Markov restriction. Since a deviation does not a¤ect the
chances of re-election, the good types will deviate to (L) while the bad types will deviate
to (X).
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